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Curve Finance Security Breach Explained: $38,200 Stolen in 138 Forged Fee-Burner Orders

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Curve Finance Fee Burner Exploit: How 138 Forged Orders Stole $38,200 of DAO Revenue

An attacker stole approximately $38,200 of Curve Finance DAO revenue on 10 November by exploiting a signature verification flaw in its Ethereum fee conversion contract — through 138 unauthorised trades. No user deposits, lending markets or crvUSD holdings were affected; the money taken was administrative fee revenue the protocol had already collected.

Small loss, big lesson. The flaw sat in a quiet back-office contract most users never think about, which is exactly why it is worth understanding. More security coverage runs on the Zimbuck News page.

The signature check that checked the wrong thing

The vulnerable contract, known as the CowSwapBurner, converts fee tokens into crvUSD for the DAO. Its isValidSignature function was meant to approve trading orders submitted through CoW Protocol — checking that an order sold tokens for crvUSD, sent proceeds to the FeeCollector and received at least 500 crvUSD.

  • 138 forged orders involving 135 tokens
  • 38,205.76 USDC taken by the attacker
  • Median fraudulent order worth only about $254; just two exceeded $500
  • First fake trade settled at 00:07 UTC on 10 November, seven minutes after the weekly window opened; the last at 11:10 UTC
  • Curve reviewed all 6,558 orders settled through the burner since June 2024 — the 138 were the only ones whose proceeds missed the FeeCollector

The bug: the contract checked whether the order described in the signature data met its rules, but never verified that the description matched the actual order being executed. It ignored the order hash. So the attacker attached a legitimate order's description to completely different transactions — and because the contract had already granted unlimited allowances, each forged order could redirect proceeds to the attacker's wallet.

Where the money went

Within four hours, the attacker swapped 37,611.76 USDC for ETH, spread it across four addresses and bridged it to Arbitrum. About 37,229.89 USDC reached Hyperliquid and was exchanged for 65.41 XMR1, a Monero-linked asset, where the balance sat untouched as of 16 November. On 15 November the remaining 594 USDC became ETH, with 0.3 ETH deposited into Tornado Cash. The stolen funds have not been recovered.

Meanwhile the honest machinery kept working: 36 legitimate orders across 35 tokens generated 97,317.74 crvUSD for the FeeCollector in the same window. Most of the balances the attacker skimmed had simply been too small to meet the contract's own 500 crvUSD minimum sale requirement.

The response, and the replacement

After an external vulnerability report on 10 November, Curve's Emergency DAO disabled fee collection and trading on Ethereum at 13:59 UTC, with Arbitrum and Base following at 16:55 UTC. Ethereum fee conversion remains paused while fees accumulate. On 17 November, residual balances in the old burner contracts on Ethereum, Base and Arbitrum were moved back to their FeeCollector contracts.

A governance proposal opened on 13 November and closing on 20 November would replace the burner with a descending-price auction system that verifies the actual order hash — closing the exact gap that was exploited. Discuss what this means for DeFi trust in the Zimbuck Market News group, and compare it with how large holders are positioning in our piece on Bitcoin ETF buying by Abu Dhabi funds.

FAQ

Were user funds affected? No. Curve confirmed user deposits, lending markets and crvUSD holdings were untouched; only collected DAO fee revenue was taken.

How much was stolen? Approximately $38,200 — precisely 38,205.76 USDC across 138 forged orders.

What caused it? A signature verification function that validated an order's description without checking it against the actual order hash.

What happens next? A DAO vote closing 20 November decides on a replacement auction-based burner that verifies the real order hash.

The takeaway for every DeFi user is boring but vital: allowances and signature checks are security-critical even in small contracts. Follow ongoing coverage and share your own safety routine with the community at Zimbuck. This article is market news and general information only, not financial advice.