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IOSCO Warns Quantum Upgrades Could Slow Blockchains and Leave Security Gaps

IOSCO Warns Quantum Upgrades Could Slow Blockchains and Leave Security Gaps

5 min de lecture

The world's securities regulators have put a date range on crypto's longest-running security question. In a 63-page final report published on 19 November, the global body that groups securities regulators from more than 130 jurisdictions warned that preparing blockchains for quantum computers could slow networks, raise fees and still leave gaps — and that the work cannot be left to the last minute.

The headline findings
- No quantum computer capable of breaking today's widely used cryptography exists yet
- Conservative estimates put such machines in the 2030 to 2035 window; some industry participants urged planning for capability within five years
- A leading post-quantum signature standard produces signatures of about 2,420 bytes — roughly 35 to 40 times the ~64-byte signatures most blockchains use today
- In one test cited in the report, a quantum-resistant version of a major network ran about 90% slower

 

Why blockchains have a harder problem than banks
A bank can swap its cryptography behind closed doors. A public blockchain cannot. Signature schemes are built into how transactions are authorised and how the network agrees on new blocks, so changing them means a coordinated upgrade — a hard fork — that every node, wallet and exchange has to adopt together. Networks named in the discussion include Ethereum, Solana and Tron.

The size problem is physical, not theoretical. If every signature grows from about 64 bytes to about 2,420 bytes, every block carries far more data for the same number of transactions. Throughput falls, bandwidth and storage costs rise, and fees follow. The test result in the report — throughput down about 90% when conventional signatures were replaced with quantum-resistant ones — shows how steep that trade-off can be with today's designs.

Layer 2 networks do not escape it either. A rollup can adopt quantum-resistant proofs for its own verification and still depend on the base chain for settlement, for moving assets between chains and for approving upgrades — each of those touchpoints keeps its own exposure until it is migrated too. Wallets that keep using older keys after a network upgrades would remain vulnerable, which is why a partial migration can leave a long tail of risk.

The risk that starts before any quantum computer exists
The report also highlights a quieter threat: "harvest now, decrypt later". An attacker can record encrypted data today — long-dated financial documents are the example that matters for markets — and simply store it until a capable machine exists to open it. For blockchains the parallel concern is old, exposed public keys sitting permanently on a public ledger: the record cannot be taken back, so the migration deadline for long-lived wallets is effectively earlier than the arrival of the machine itself.

 

What regulators want done now
The report sets no deadlines of its own. Instead it maps the steps already appearing in national plans: start with an inventory of everywhere cryptography is used, build governance and transition plans, design for "crypto agility" — the ability to swap algorithms without redesigning the whole system — test the new schemes early, and work through the same questions with vendors. The body says it will treat quantum preparedness as a priority in 2027, and it also warned firms and regulators to watch for "quantum washing" — products overstating how quantum-ready they really are.

What this means for crypto holders
Nothing in the report says a break is imminent, and researchers working on post-quantum designs for major networks have been publishing upgrade paths for some time — this is a migration problem measured in years, not a fire alarm. The practical takeaways are the boring ones: keep wallets and apps updated, pay attention when your network announces its post-quantum roadmap, be sceptical of any product selling quantum fear, and remember that the coins most at risk in the long run are those sitting untouched in very old wallets. Read more security coverage on the Zimbuck News page (https://zimbuck.com/pages/zimbucknews) and compare notes in the Zimbuck Market News group (https://zimbuck.com/groups/zimbuckmarketnews). For a related read, see how tampered hardware wallets reached buyers in Dubai: https://zimbuck.com/blogs/5344/Ledger-Wallet-Tampering-Fears-Reach-Dubai-as-Two-Users-Report

FAQ
Can a quantum computer steal crypto today? No. No machine capable of breaking the cryptography that secures major networks exists yet; the warning is about how long preparation takes.
Why would quantum-safe upgrades slow a blockchain down? Post-quantum signatures are far larger — about 2,420 bytes versus roughly 64 bytes — so blocks carry more data and throughput falls unless designs change.
Which networks are affected? All public blockchains that rely on traditional signatures, including Ethereum, Solana and Tron; each needs a coordinated upgrade rather than a simple patch.
When could the threat arrive? Conservative estimates say 2030 to 2035; some industry participants told regulators to be ready within five years.

This article is market news and general information only, not financial advice. Join the discussion at https://zimbuck.com .