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Gonka Bridge and sBOLD Vault Drained in $4.48 Million Ethereum Exploits

Gonka Bridge and sBOLD Vault Drained in $4.48 Million Ethereum Exploits

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Two Ethereum exploits on 18 November drained an estimated $4.48 million in a single day — $3.43 million from the sBOLD vault and $1.05 million from the Gonka bridge — in a pair of attacks that had nothing to do with each other except timing, and everything to do with how much trust DeFi users place in keys, shares and bridge reserves.

The sBOLD vault was emptied in about eight minutes. The Gonka bridge lost its stablecoin reserves after a change involving its signing key, and unbacked wrapped tokens were minted on top of the theft.

The sBOLD vault: emptied in eight minutes

sBOLD is a vault that pools deposits of BOLD, a dollar-pegged stablecoin, and automatically reinvests the rewards earned through a set of Stability Pools. Depositors hold vault shares representing their stake in the pooled assets.

The drain ran from 12:25:23 to 12:33:35 UTC — roughly eight minutes, across 37 blocks and 97 transactions. One bot was behind 57 of those transactions and accounted for about 56% of the value removed. The method, in plain terms: the attacker obtained vault shares at a low cost and redeemed them for BOLD that belonged to other depositors.

Two details from the on-chain trail deserve attention:

  • About $1.78 million of the stolen value — roughly 52% of the calculated loss — was paid to Ethereum block builders, the parties who assemble and order transactions. There is no indication the builders knew what the bot was doing; the payments look like the cost of getting the drain transactions included quickly and in the right order.
  • The vault lost everything it held. By the time the pause was announced at 13:08 UTC — about 35 minutes after the drain finished — there was nothing left to protect.

The vault's operator said it was investigating malicious activity and had paused the contracts. Its initial notice gave no loss estimate and no timetable for reopening.

The Gonka bridge: a signing key and unbacked tokens

The second incident hit a cross-chain bridge. Under normal operation, stablecoins such as USDT and USDC are locked on Ethereum so wrapped versions can circulate on the Gonka network; when holders move back, the bridge releases the original stablecoins from its reserve. Native GNK moving the other way sits in escrow, and an equivalent amount of WGNK is issued on Ethereum.

The attack was attributed to a change involving the signing key for the bridge. With that key compromised, the attacker:

  • Emptied the stablecoins still held in the bridge — about $1.05 million realised across roughly five transactions.
  • Minted WGNK without backing — tokens that claim escrowed GNK behind them when there is none.

That second step is what makes bridge compromises so corrosive. Draining a reserve is a theft with a fixed size. Minting unbacked wrapped tokens creates claims against an escrow that cannot honour them all, and every honest holder's redemption is diluted until the project makes the hole good.

Security discussion, exploit breakdowns and safety guides are shared daily in the Zimbuck Market News group, and the Zimbuck News page tracks incidents like this as the facts firm up. A recent security article on the Curve Finance breach and what it showed about approval risk covers the companion risk on the user side.

What these two attacks have in common

Neither incident began with a flashy zero-day. One turned on the economics of vault shares — acquire them cheaply, redeem them dearly, faster than anyone can react. The other turned on a single signing key standing between an attacker and a bridge's reserves.

The lessons repeat so often they should be reflexes by now:

  • Speed is the attacker's real weapon. Eight minutes is not enough time for a human team to notice, decide and pause. Vaults and bridges need automatic circuit breakers, not dashboards.
  • A single key is a single point of total failure. Any bridge whose reserves move on one signature is one compromise away from exactly this headline.
  • Unbacked minting multiplies the damage. Audit the mint function and who can call it with the same seriousness as the reserve itself.
  • Builder payments are part of the modern exploit budget. When half the loot goes to transaction ordering, the drain was engineered, not improvised.

FAQ

How much was stolen in total?
An estimated $4.48 million across both incidents: about $3.43 million from the sBOLD vault and about $1.05 million from the Gonka bridge. The estimate does not assign a separate value to the unbacked tokens that were minted.

Was the sBOLD vault's underlying protocol broken?
The loss was in the third-party vault layer that pools deposits and reinvests rewards. The exploit centred on obtaining vault shares cheaply and redeeming them against other depositors' assets.

What does "unbacked WGNK" mean for holders?
WGNK is meant to be redeemable for escrowed GNK. Tokens minted without escrow behind them are claims the escrow cannot fully honour, so redemptions depend on how the project responds.

Is the sBOLD vault reopening?
Contracts were paused while the operator investigates. No reopening timetable was given in the initial notice.

What should users of similar vaults and bridges do?
Check official channels before depositing again, review token approvals granted to vault and bridge contracts, and treat any single-key bridge design as a risk factor in itself.

Exploits like these are exactly why the security side of this market matters as much as the price side. Follow the follow-ups and the wider safety coverage on Zimbuck as both investigations publish their findings.

This article is market news and general information only, not financial advice.